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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996), the Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction of this appeal from the Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
Dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint, dated June 16,1999. (R. 258-60).1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING 
THE COMPLAINT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF CLAIM PRECLUSION? 
The district court's decision to dismiss the Complaint under the first branch of the 
doctrine of res judicata, claim preclusion, should be reviewed for correctness. See Macris 
& Associates v. Newavs. 986 P.2d 748, 749 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).2 This issue was 
preserved below with Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Request for Oral Argument 
(R. 21-22) and supporting memorandum (R. 24-107) filed by defendants-appellees Kent 
Palmer and Robin Palmer ("Palmers") and the memorandum filed by plaintiff-appellant 
Scholzen Products Company ("Scholzen") opposing the motion. (R. 110-238). 
1
 Because this appeal involves two lawsuits, the clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court 
created two separate indexes which constitute the record in this appeal. Cites to the index 
record in the instant action, Case No. 990500428, are indicated by "R" followed by the 
page in the record in which the cited material appears. Cites to the index record in the 
previous litigation between the parties, Case. No. 970500787, are indicated by "Rl" 
followed by the page in the record in which the cited material appears. 
2
 Although the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Request for Oral Argument was 
styled as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it 
was properly treated as a motion for summary judgment by the district court because the 
Palmers and Scholzen supported their respective memoranda with sources outside the 
pleadings. See American Estate Mgmt. Corp. v. Int'l Investment & Development Corp., 
986 P.2d 765, n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
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II. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING 
THE COMPLAINT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF ISSUE PRECLUSION? 
The district court's decision to dismiss the Complaint under the second branch of 
the doctrine of res judicata, issue preclusion, should be reviewed for correctness. See 
Macris & Associates. 986 P.2d at 749. This issue was preserved below with Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss and Request for Oral Argument (R. 21-22) and supporting 
memorandum (R. 24-107) filed by the Palmers and the memorandum filed by Scholzen 
opposing the motion. (R. 110-238). 
III. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING 
THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM U PON WHICH 
RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED? 
The district court's decision to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted should be reviewed for correctness. See Macris & 
Associates. 986 P.2d at 749. This issue was preserved below with Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and Request for Oral Argument (R. 21-22) and supporting memorandum (R. 24-
107) filed by the Palmers and the memorandum filed by Scholzen opposing the motion. 
(R. 110-238). 
IV. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING 
THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE SCHOLZEN HAS SUFFERED NO 
DAMAGES? 
The district court's decision to dismiss the Complaint because Scholzen has 
suffered no damages should be reviewed for correctness. See Macris & Associates. 986 
P.2d at 749. This issue was preserved below with Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
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Request for Oral Argument (R. 21-22) and supporting memorandum (R. 24-107) filed by 
the Palmers and the memorandum filed by Scholzen opposing the motion. (R. 110-238). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This appeal concerns a dispute between Scholzen and the Palmers over whether 
the Palmers are obligated to provide an easement to Dale Dockstader ("Dockstader") 
pursuant to a Settlement Agreement executed in April 1995 by Dockstader and Scholzen 
("Settlement Agreement") or pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement dated May 4, 
1995 between Scholzen and the Palmers ("Purchase Agreement"). 
In prior litigation commenced by Dockstader on April 30, 1997 against Scholzen 
and the Palmers in the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County entitled Dale 
Dockstader and Dale R. Huntsman v. Scholzen Products Co., Kent and Robin Palmer, et 
aL, Case No. 970500787 ("Dockstader Litigation"), the Honorable G. Rand Beacham 
ruled in a Memorandum Decision dated December 1, 1998, that the Palmers were not 
obligated to provide an easement to Dockstader under either the Settlement Agreement or 
the Purchase Agreement. Judge Beacham also ruled that Scholzen's Motion to Amend 
Answer, Counterclaim and Crossclaim ("Motion to Amend") to allege causes of action 
for fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith, and willful 
misconduct against the Palmers was improper because the proposed causes of action were 
brought late in the litigation and were based on alleged facts which Scholzen knew or 
should have known from the outset of the litigation. (R. 104-05). Judge Beacham also 
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ruled that there no factual basis for Scholzen's proposed causes of action against the 
Palmers. (R. 105). 
Not satisfied with Judge Beacham's rulings in the Dockstader Litigation, Scholzen 
commenced this litigation by filing the Complaint against the Palmers on March 16, 
1999. The causes of action in this litigation for fraud in the inducement, negligent 
misrepresentation, bad faith, and willful misconduct are identical to the causes of action 
that Scholzen belatedly attempted to bring in the Dockstader Litigation. (R. 1-12). 
The Palmers sought dismissal of the Complaint on four separate grounds: (a) the 
Complaint was barred by claim preclusion, the first branch of the doctrine of res judicata; 
(b) the Complaint was barred by issue preclusion, the second branch of the doctrine of res 
judicata; (c) the Complaint failed to state a claim against the Palmers upon which relief 
could be granted; and (d) Scholzen had suffered no damages as a result of the Palmers' 
conduct as alleged in the Complaint. (R. 21-22,24-107). 
In its opposing memorandum, Scholzen argued that res judicata did not apply and 
that it had been damaged by the Palmers' actions. Scholzen did not address or otherwise 
dispute the Palmers' third ground for dismissal that the Complaint failed to state a claim 
against the Palmers upon which relief could be granted. (R. 110-238). 
At oral argument held on May 26, 1999, the Honorable James L. Shumate 
dismissed the Complaint. (R. 270). On June 16,1999, Judge Shumate executed an Order 
on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint. (R. 258-60). 
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
In contrast to Scholzen's Statement of Facts (App. Brief at 3-9), which, among 
other things, omits certain important facts, mischaracterizes other facts and alleges facts 
which are either not relevant to the issues before this Court or contain factual conclusions 
or legal conclusions not supported by the record, the Palmers offer the following 
Statement of Facts. 
A. The Palmers' Purchase of Scholzen's Interest in the Real Property. 
In April 1995, Scholzen and Dockstader entered into the Settlement Agreement to 
resolve certain disputes concerning the real property. (R. 48-55). The Settlement 
Agreement provided that if either Scholzen or Dockstader sold their interest in the real 
property to the Palmers, the selling party would obtain an easement from the Palmers. (R. 
52-53). The Palmers were not parties to the Settlement Agreement. (R. 27-28). 
On May 4, 1995, Scholzen sold its interest in the real property to the Palmers 
pursuant to the Purchase Agreement. (R. 101; Rl. 517-29a). Scholzen, however, did not 
obtain an easement from the Palmers as required by the Settlement Agreement with 
Dockstader. Indeed, the Purchase Agreement does not mention the easement or the 
Settlement Agreement. (R. 101). 
Moreover, the Purchase Agreement is an integrated document. Paragraph 14 of 
the Purchase Agreement expressly provides: 
14. Entire Agreement. This Agreement sets forth the 
entire understanding of Seller [Scholzen] and Buyer [the 
Palmers] as to matters set forth herein and cannot be altered 
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or otherwise amended except pursuant to an instrument in 
writing signed by each of the parties hereto. 
(R1.523a). 
On September 30, 1996, the sale of the real property closed with Scholzen 
executing and delivering a Warranty Deed conveying its interest in the real property to 
the Palmers. The Warranty Deed does not mention the easement or the Settlement 
Agreement. (R. 102). 
B. The Dockstader Litigation, 
On April 30, 1997, Dockstader commenced the Dockstader Litigation by filing a 
Complaint against Scholzen and the Palmers alleging that Scholzen breached the 
Settlement Agreement by failing to obtain an easement from the Palmers and that the 
Palmers had interfered with Dockstader's easement and breached their fiduciary duty as 
co-tenants with Dockstader. (R. 39-55). The case was assigned to Judge G. Rand 
Beacham. 
On June 26, 1997, Scholzen filed an Answer and Counterclaim against Dockstader 
and a Crossclaim against the Palmers. (R. 57-66). In its Answer, Scholzen affirmatively 
alleged: 
14. With regard to Paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
Defendant Scholzen admits that the interest was transferred, 
but denies each and every other allegation contained therein. 
Further, Defendant Scholzen specifically alleges that 
Defendant Scholzen obtained the specific representation and 
promise from Defendant Palmer, that Defendant Palmer was 
taking the property subject to said agreement and would 
deliver all portions of the contract requirements, including but 
not limited to the twenty-foot easement. 
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* * * 
17. With regard to Paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
Defendant Scholzen claims that the document speaks for itself 
and affirmatively alleges that Defendant Scholzen performed 
all of its duties to the Plaintiffs by selling said interest in said 
property to Defendant Palmer, subject to the settlement 
agreement. Further, Defendant Scholzen affirmatively alleges 
that Defendant Scholzen provided notice of all of these 
transactions to Plaintiffs by and through counsel. 
(R. 59). 
Further, Scholzen alleged in its Counterclaim against Dockstader: 
7. That at the time the property interest was sold to 
Defendant Palmer, and prior thereto, Counterclaimant 
Scholzen specifically informed Defendant Palmer of 
Defendant Palmer's duty and responsibility to provide a 20-
foot easement pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. 
8. That at the time of the sale of the interest in the subject 
property, Defendant Palmer, for themselves and by and 
through counsel, affirmed Defendant Palmer's responsibility 
to provide an appropriate easement as required in the 
described Settlement Agreement. 
(R. 61). 
Similarly, Scholzen alleged in its Crossclaim against the Palmers: 
6. That at the time the property interest was sold to 
Crossclaim Defendant Palmer, and prior thereto, 
Crossclaimant Scholzen specifically informed Crossclaim 
Defendant Palmer of Crossclaim Defendant Palmer's duty 
and responsibility to provide a 20-foot easement pursuant to 
the Settlement Agreement. 
7. That at the time of the sale of the interest in the subject 
property, Crossclaim Defendant Palmer, for themselves and 
by and through counsel, affirmed Crossclaim Defendant 
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Palmer's responsibility to provide an appropriate easement as 
required in the described Settlement Agreement. 
* * * 
12. That Crossclaim Defendant Palmer accepted the 
property with the responsibility of obtaining the easement 
directly from Dockstader, and that, as such, Crossclaim 
Defendant Palmer should indemnify Crossclaimant Scholzen 
for any costs or expenses incurred in defending this action, 
including attorney's fees, etc. 
(R. 63-65). 
The Palmers filed their Answer to Dockstader's Complaint on July 11, 1997. In 
their Answer, the Palmers specifically denied Dockstader's allegations and in their 
Thirteenth Affirmative Defense, alleged that the Settlement Agreement was not binding 
on the Palmers. (Rl. 35-41). 
The Palmers filed their Answer to Scholzen's Crossclaim on July 29, 1997. In 
their Answer, the Palmers specifically denied Scholzen's allegations and in their Twelfth 
Affirmative Defense, alleged that the Settlement Agreement was not binding on the 
Palmers. (RL 44-49). 
On August 19, 1997, Dockstader filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The grounds for Dockstader's motion were that Scholzen had not obtained a binding 
agreement with the Palmers for the easement as required by the Settlement Agreement. 
(Rl. 49-85). 
In support of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Dockstader included the 
following undisputed facts, supported by the Affidavit of Dale Dockstader: 
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4. The Purchase and Sale Agreement is silent with 
regards to the Settlement Agreement between Dockstader and 
Scholzen. Furthermore, the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
fails to contain any language contractually obligating the 
Palmers' [sic] to provide a 20 foot wide strip of their property 
to be combined with the existing 20 foot wide access so as to 
provide a 40 foot wide roadway access to the 28 acre parcel 
[the easement]. 
* * * 
10. Neither the Warranty Deed nor the Trust Deed impose 
a duty upon the Palmers to provide a 20 foot wide strip of 
their property for access to the 28 acre parcel of property [the 
easement]. 
11. After the closing Dockstader learned that Scholzen had 
not obtained a binding agreement with the Palmers regarding 
the additional 20 foot wide access [the easement]. 
* * * 
13. Dockstader has attempted to negotiate with the 
Palmers but the Palmers refuse to deed, by way of easement 
or otherwise, a 20 foot wide parcel of their property for access 
to the 28 acre parcel of property [the easement]. 
(Rl. 52-53, 88-91). 
On May 28, 1998, Scholzen filed a memorandum opposing Dockstader's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment. (Rl. 103-94). In its memorandum, Scholzen argued that 
it had "obtained the agreement" of the Palmers to provide the easement because: 
[I]t is clear that Defendant Palmer were [sic] aware of the 
Settlement Agreement, knew the terms of the Settlement 
Agreement, helped draft the important provisions of the 
Settlement Agreement that apply in this particular case, 
evaluated with the help of counsel the chain of title which 
included Quit-Claim Deeds which had the specific deed 
restriction, and finally, Defendant Palmer began negotiations 
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for the delivery of an easement immediately following the 
closing of the sale between Defendant Scholzen and 
Defendant Palmer. 
(Rl. 110). 
On June 3, 1998, Dockstader filed the Supplemental Affidavit of Dale Dockstader, 
in which Dockstader states: 
4. [After learning that Scholzen had not obtained an 
easement from the Palmers], I thereafter confronted 
Scholzen's officers regarding their failure to obtain an 
agreement from the Palmers regarding [the easement]. The 
officers told me that they were not obligated to obtain that 
agreement, but that I would have to negotiate the matter with 
the Palmers. 
5. I then tried to negotiate the matter with the Palmers. 
They only offered to deed an additional 10 foot wide strip of 
property, rather than the 20 foot wide strip. In addition, the 
Palmers added the condition that the 10 foot wide strip could 
not be used as a roadway, but instead could only be used as a 
utility easement. The Palmers have never agreed to donate 20 
additional feet of their property to be used as a roadway [the 
easement]. 
6. In addition, the Palmers have never acknowledged that 
they are obligated by their purchase of the Scholzen property 
to provide the additional 20 foot wide strip for a roadway 
access [the easement]." 
(Rl. 201-03). 
On June 22, 1998, Scholzen filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
Crossclaim against the Palmers. (Rl. 206-07, 208-301). In support of its motion, 
Scholzen argued the same facts it argued in opposing Dockstader's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. (Rl. 208-14). 
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On July 7, 1998, the Palmers filed an opposing memorandum and affidavits to 
Scholzen's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, specifically arguing that the Purchase 
Agreement, which is an integrated document, does not mention the Settlement Agreement 
or the easement and that at "no time did the Palmers agree to be bound by the Settlement 
Agreement or to grant Dockstader an additional twenty-foot easement as a condition of 
the purchase of the Property." (Rl. 309-55). 
In the hearing held on July 16, 1998, Judge Beacham denied Scholzen's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment (Rl. 375), observing there were no facts, even 
unsupported facts, which would indicate that the Palmers agreed to provide Dockstader 
with an easement or that the Palmers were bound by the Settlement Agreement. (R. 27-
28). Specifically, Judge Beacham stated: 
In addition, considering the general merits of [Scholzen's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment], there are no facts 
even unsupported and stated by [Scholzen] to indicate that the 
Palmers accepted paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement 
to which they were not parties and in the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement to which the Palmers agreed there is no 
requirement that they grant the easement and that [the] 
Purchase and Sale Agreement is stated to be, by its own 
terms, an integrated document In addition, I find that 
even if all of Scholzen's statements of fact were properly 
supported and to be construed in its favor, which would be 
opposite of the construction the rules would require, the 
motion would fail as a matter of law because it fails to 
establish that the plaintiff is entitled as a matter of law to hold 
the Palmers to an agreement or a term of agreement that is not 
anywhere in any document signed by them 
(R. 27-28). 
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Dockstader dismissed the Palmers from the Dockstader Litigation on September 
17,1998. (Rl. 382-84). 
On October 14, 1998, the Palmers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Scholzen's Crossclaim on the grounds that there were no statutory, contractual or 
equitable bases for Scholzen's claim that the Palmers were obligated to provide an 
easement to Dockstader. (Rl. 416-30). 
On October 15, 1998, a day after the Palmers filed their Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Scholzen filed a Motion to Amend Answer, Counterclaim and Crossclaim (the 
"Motion to Amend"). (Rl. 431-83). The proposed amended Crossclaim, identical in 
almost every respect to the Complaint in this appeal, asserted causes of action for fraud in 
the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith-rescission, bad faith-damages and 
willful misconduct-punitive damages. (R. 67-90). 
Also on October 15, 1998, Dockstader filed a Second Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Against Scholzen. (Rl. 484-533). The grounds for Dockstader's motion were 
that Scholzen breached the Settlement Agreement by failing to obtain the agreement of 
the Palmers to provide the easement. (Rl. 487-88). In support of his motion, Dockstader 
argued essentially the same facts as he did in support of his first Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. This time, the facts were supported by the depositions of Dale 
Dockstader and Bruce Ballard, president of Scholzen. (Rl. 488-92). 
The Palmers opposed Scholzen's Motion to Amend on the grounds that it was late 
in the course of the Dockstader Litigation and that the proposed new causes of action 
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were futile. (Rl. 555-60). Specifically, the Palmers argued that Scholzen's proposed 
new causes of action were not supported by any new factual allegations. Therefore, the 
Palmers argued, these new claims failed as a matter of law because Scholzen offered no 
new evidence to support these claims. (Rl. 558-59). 
A hearing was held on these motions on November 12, 1998. (R. 98). After 
hearing oral argument, after reviewing the parties' memoranda, affidavits and exhibits, 
and after reviewing relevant Utah law, Judge Beacham issued a Memorandum Decision 
on December 1, 1998 granting Dockstader's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
against Scholzen, granting Palmers' Motion for Summary Judgment against Scholzen, 
and denying Scholzen's Motion to Amend (R. 98-107). 
In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Beacham specifically found the following 
facts in response to Scholzen's arguments that the Palmers' agreed to provide the 
easement: 
On May 4, 1995, Scholzen and the Palmers entered into a 
Purchase and Sale Agreement for Palmers to purchase 
Scholzen's interest in the Subject Property. This Purchase 
and Sale Agreement made no mention of the Settlement 
Agreement between Scholzen and Dockstader, and did not 
include any agreement obligating Palmers to 'donate 20 
additional feet of their property.' 
* * * 
The Scholzen/Palmer agreement was closed near the end of 
September of 1996, and Scholzen's interest in the Subject 
Property was conveyed to Palmers. Neither the deed 
conveying Scholzen's interest nor any other document 
contains any agreement by Palmers to donate additional 
footage as required by the Settlement Agreement. Palmers 
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have never agreed to be bound by the Settlement Agreement 
or to grant Dockstader any additional footage. 
(R. 101-02). 
Judge Beacham's decision then analyzed whether Scholzen obtained an agreement 
from the Palmers as required by the Settlement Agreement. In finding that Scholzen did 
not obtain an agreement from the Palmers, Judge Beacham found: 
Scholzen also argues that it did obtain an agreement with 
Palmers, but can provide no admissible evidence of such an 
agreement; Scholzen cannot rely on discussions between 
Dockstader and Palmers, especially those occurring after it 
sold its interest in the Subject Property, to meet its own pre-
sale obligations. Scholzen argues that it was misled, that it 
relied on alleged representations regarding [Dockstader's] 
discussions with Palmers, that paragraph 14 was a mistake 
(apparently a unilateral mistake), and that Palmers were, in 
some unidentified way, bound by the Settlement Agreement 
to which they were not a party or signatory. Scholzen has 
provided absolutely no admissible evidence to support these 
arguments, however. Scholzen also argues about what it 
would have done or would not have done, but for the alleged 
representations and mistakes, but it cannot identify any 
manner in which it obtained from Palmers either an easement 
or an agreement for an easement or additional footage. Even 
if statute of fraud issues and the inadmissibility of some of 
Scholzen's offered evidence are ignored for the sake of 
argument, Scholzen has identified nothing to demonstrate that 
it even attempted to meet its obligation, except vague and 
truly ambiguous allusions in (a) one fax cover sheet from 
[Dockstader5 s] attorney and (b) one noncommittal letter from 
Palmers' attorney, prior to his receipt of a title insurance 
commitment, requesting information on Scholzen's agreement 
with [Dockstader]. 
(R. 101-03). 
Finally, Judge Beacham denied Scholzen's Motion to Amend because 
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Scholzen's proposed amendments are brought late in this 
litigation, after considerable discovery, time and expense, but 
are based on alleged facts of which Scholzen seems to have 
had, or should have had, knowledge of from very near the 
outset of this case without providing the Court with an 
adequate explanation for the delay . . . Furthermore, 
Scholzen's proposed amended crossclaims are all in the 
nature of tort claims, while the subject of this action and all 
discovery conducted by the parties has involved, to this point, 
only contract claims. As a general rule, tort actions and 
claims for punitive damages are not actionable within a 
contract claim, unless the alleged acts also support a cause of 
action in tort, [internal citations omitted] In addition, 
Scholzen has demonstrated virtually no factual basis for the 
proposed claims, and the courts generally refuse to allow 
leave to amend the pleadings when the proposed changes 
appear futile. 
(R. 104-05). 
C. The Litigation Between Scholzen and the Palmers, 
On March 16, 1999, Scholzen filed the Complaint against the Palmers asserting 
causes of action for fraud in the inducement-rescission, fraud in the inducement-damages, 
negligent misrepresentation, bad faith-rescission, bad faith-damages and willful 
misconduct-punitive damages. (R. 1-12). The Complaint is virtually identical to the 
proposed Amended Crossclaim filed by Scholzen in the Dockstader Litigation. (R. 1-12). 
Indeed, in support of the Complaint, Scholzen alleged the following facts: 
10. In December of 1994, Palmer made inquiry into the 
Settlement Agreement involving Scholzen and Dockstader. 
* * * 
13. Between February 9, 1995, and March 30, 1995, 
Palmer and Dockstader entered into discussions regarding 
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easements and access to the property subject to the Settlement 
Agreement. 
14. Pursuant to the discussions between Palmer and 
Dockstader, a paragraph was proposed by Dockstader to 
Scholzen, regarding access and easements to the property 
subject to the Settlement Agreement. 
15. That the terms and conditions of the language to be 
added to the Settlement Agreement were discussed between 
Dockstader and Palmer, and Dockstader and Palmer came to a 
consensus as to the terms and conditions of the language to be 
added to the Settlement Agreement.3 
* * * 
18. On the 4 ^ day of May, 1995, documents were 
delivered to Palmer, personally, which documents included 
the April, 1995, Settlement Agreement which included the 
new Paragraph 14, together with copies of Quit-Claim Deeds, 
made pursuant to the April, 1995 Settlement Agreement, 
which contained the terms 'subject to the terms of the 
Settlement Agreement entered into between grantor and 
grantee on February 9, 1995, which Settlement Agreement 
discusses issues of access to the property between grantor atnd 
grantee, and a co-tenancy agreement regarding development 
of said property.'4 
19. On the 30 th day of May, 1995, Palmer acknowledged 
that the property subject to the [Purchase Agreement] was 
subject to a Settlement Agreement and a co-tenancy 
agreement. 
3
 Interestingly, Scholzen admitted in the Dockstader Litigation that Dockstader and the 
Palmers did not discuss the Settlement Agreement and they did not come to a consensus 
about paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement. Thus, the allegations in paragraphs 13-
15 of the Complaint have been specifically refuted. (Rl. 555-60). 
4
 This paragraph fails to state that the documents which were delivered involved the 
Purchase Agreement with its integration clause. 
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20. On the 30th day of May, 1995, Palmer, by and through 
their counsel of record, acknowledged that Palmer had been 
provided with a copy of the Settlement Agreement, undated, 
between Dockstader; another third-party, namely, Huntsman; 
Russell J. Gallian and Scholzen. 
21. From May 4, 1995, to and including the 30^ day of 
September, 1996, Palmer, for themselves and by and through 
their attorney, Shawn Ferrin, performed extensive 'due 
diligence', pursuant to the [Purchase Agreement], verbally 
and in writing. 
24. On or before the 30th day of September, 1996, Clifford 
V. Dunn, for and on behalf of Scholzen, requested a deed 
restriction from Shawn Ferrin, attorney for Palmer, which 
deed restriction would reference the Settlement Agreement 
between Dockstader and Scholzen, which is the subject of this 
litigation. Shawn Ferrin indicated that Palmer was out of 
town and would not be able to review the deed restriction. 
Shawn Ferrin further indicated that Palmer was fully aware of 
the requirement to provide a 20-foot easement for access 
across his property and further that Palmer would be subject 
to the Settlement Agreement. Shawn Ferrin indicated that 
Palmer's portion of the purchase agreement was subject to a 
1031 exchange, and that the closing had to be completed by 
the 30^ of September, 1996, or Palmer would lose their 1031 
exchange favorable tax treatment. Shawn Ferrin, for and in 
behalf of Palmer, requested that Scholzen execute the 
Warranty Deed as it was prepared by him, without deed 
restriction, as an accommodation to Palmer, and that Palmer 
would thereafter acknowledge and be responsible for the 
Settlement Agreement. 
25. In reliance upon the specific representations of Shawn 
Ferrin, for and in behalf of Palmer, to Clifford V. Dunn, as 
attorney for Scholzen, and based upon the specific 
understanding by Scholzen that the Warranty Deed and the 
other agreements for the sale were not intended to be a fully 
integrated agreement, such that Palmer would be subject to 
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the Settlement Agreement, Scholzen executed the Warranty 
Deed and concluded the closing. 
26. That at the time the property interest was sold to 
Palmer, and prior thereto, Scholzen specifically informed 
Palmer of Palmer's duty and responsibility to provide a 20-
foot easement pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. 
* * * 
31. That Palmer accepted the property with the 
responsibility of delivering the easement for access directly to 
Dockstader. 
(R. 2-6). 
These are essentially the same facts that formed the basis for the Crossclaim in the 
Dockstader Litigation. (R. 28-30). 
On April 12, 1999, the Palmers filed their Motion to Dismiss and Request for Oral 
Argument. (R. 21-23). In their supporting memorandum, the Palmers argued three 
separate grounds for dismissal: (a) the Complaint was barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata; (b) the Complaint failed to state a claim against the Palmers upon which relief 
could be granted; and (c) Scholzen had suffered no damages as a result of the Palmers' 
conduct as alleged in the Complaint. (R. 24-107). 
On May 5, 1999, Scholzen filed a memorandum and affidavit in opposition to the 
Palmers' Motion to Dismiss. (R. 110-238). In its memorandum, Scholzen solely argued 
that res judicata did not apply and it had been damaged by the Palmers' actions. Scholzen 
did not refute or otherwise oppose the Palmers' argument that Scholzen failed to allege 
sufficient facts in the Complaint to support its causes of action for fraud in the 
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inducement-rescission, fraud in the inducement-damages, negligent misrepresentation, 
bad faith-rescission, bad faith damages and willful misconduct-punitive damages. (R. 
110-238). 
On May 26, 1999, Judge Shumate heard oral argument on the Palmers' Motion to 
Dismiss. (R. 270). At the conclusion of oral argument, Judge Shumate granted the 
Palmers' Motion to Dismiss. (R. 270). On June 16, 1999, Judge Shumate executed the 
Palmers' Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Dismissal of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. (R. 258-60). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court correctly dismissed the Complaint because Scholzen's claims 
against the Palmers are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The purpose of res judicata 
is to prevent "pointless litigation" and "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple 
lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, 
encourage reliance on adjudication." Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.. 
758 P.2d 451, 453 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 395). These 
are "vital public interests." American Estate Mgmt. Corp.. 986 P.2d at 767. 
The Complaint filed by Scholzen was nothing more than a belated attempt to bring 
claims against the Palmers that were either dismissed or could have and should have been 
brought in the Dockstader Litigation. Indeed, Scholzen, based upon admissions contained 
in its own pleadings, knew all of the facts alleged in support of these claims before or 
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immediately after the commencement of the Dockstader Litigation. Thus, the Complaint 
was barred by claim preclusion, the first branch of the doctrine of res judicata. 
The Complaint was also barred by issue preclusion, the second branch of the 
doctrine of res judicata because several of Judge Beacham's findings in the Dockstader 
Litigation were determinative of key issues raised in this case. Specifically, Judge 
Beacham found that the Palmers never agreed to be bound by the Settlement Agreement 
or provide an easement to Dockstader. Issue preclusion barred Scholzen from relitigating 
these issues and consequently, Scholzen's claims against the Palmers for fraud in the 
inducement, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith and willful misconduct fail as a matter 
of law. 
The Complaint was also correctly dismissed because, res judicata notwithstanding, 
Scholzen failed to plead any facts sufficient to support its claims against the Palmers and 
Scholzen had suffered no damages as a result of the Palmers' alleged conduct. 
Accordingly, as stated above and as more fully set forth below, the district court 
properly dismissed the Complaint on the basis of res judicata, failure to state a claim on 
which relief could be granted and no damages. This Court should affirm the district 
court's dismissal of the Complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE 
COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS OF CLAIM PRECLUSION. 
The doctrine of res judicata "reflects the refusal of courts to tolerate pointless 
litigation and is based on the premise that the proper administration of justice is best 
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served by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or cause." Trimble Real Estate, 758 
P.2d at 453. Res judicata has two separate but related branches that can be asserted as 
affirmative defenses. The first branch, now known as claim preclusion, bars the 
relitigation by the parties or their privies of a claim for relief previously resolved by a 
final judgment on the merits.5 It also prevents relitigation of claims that could have and 
should have been litigated in the prior action but were not. Id. 
The district court correctly dismissed the Complaint under claim preclusion 
because the causes of action asserted by Scholzen in the Complaint were either previously 
resolved by Judge Beacham's ruling on the Palmers' Motion for Summary Judgment or 
could have and should have been brought in the Dockstader Litigation but were not. 
Indeed, all of the facts giving rise to these causes of action arose prior to Scholzen's filing 
of its Crossclaim against the Palmers in the Dockstader Litigation. 
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, Scholzen's claims for fraud in the 
inducement, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith and willful misconduct in this 
litigation are barred by the judgment in the Dockstader Litigation if (1) both cases involve 
the same parties, their privities or assignees; (2) Scholzen's claims were presented or 
could have been presented in the Dockstader Litigation; and (3) there was a final 
5
 A claim, or cause of action, is generally defined as a "the aggregate of operative facts 
which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts." A claim is the "situation or state of 
facts which entitles a party to sustain an action and gives him the right to seek judicial 
interference in his behalf." Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care. 766 P.2d 1059,1062 
(Utah 1988) (internal citations omitted). 
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judgment on the merits in the Dockstader Litigation. See Murdock v. Springville Mun. 
Corp. fin re General Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water), 982 P.2d 
65, 70 (Utah 1999); Fitzgerald v. Corbett 793 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 1990). If these 
elements are satisfied, the judgment in the Dockstader Litigation is final and serves as the 
full measure of relief to be accorded between Scholzen and the Palmers. See American 
Estate Mgmt. Corp.. 986 P.2d at 767. 
Scholzen concedes that the first element is met in this case because Scholzen and 
the Palmers were both parties to the Dockstader Litigation. (App. Brief at 28). Scholzen, 
however, argues that the second and third elements are not satisfied in this case. (App. 
Brief at 28-32). Scholzen's arguments reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
doctrine of claim preclusion. As addressed below, the second and third elements of claim 
preclusion are clearly met in this case because Scholzen could have and should have 
brought these claims in the Dockstader Litigation. Consequently, the district court 
properly dismissed the Complaint on the basis of claim preclusion. 
A, Scholzen's Claims Could Have or Should Have Been Brought in the 
Dockstader Litigation, 
The second requirement of claim preclusion is satisfied if the claims that are 
asserted to be barred were presented or could have been presented in the first case. In re 
General Determination. 982 P.2d at 70; Fitzgerald. 793 P.2d at 359. This requirement 
"reflects the expectation that parties who are given the capacity to present their ' entire 
controversy' shall in fact do so." American Estate Mgmt. Corp.. 986 P.2d at 768 (quoting 
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Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works. 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). If a party fails, 
purposefully or negligently to do so, the party "will not afterward be permitted to deny 
the correctness of that determination, nor to relitigate the same matters between the same 
parties." Id. Thus, the second element of claim preclusion is met in this case because the 
Complaint consists solely of claims against the Palmers that could have or should have 
been brought in the Dockstader Litigation. 
In determining whether the claims were presented or could have been presented in 
the previous litigation, this Court reviews whether the new claim is based on essentially 
the same operative facts as the prior claim. If so, the new claim is barred by res judicata 
even though the new claim for relief alleges a different legal theory for recovery. See 
Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme Inc.. 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983). Thus, the doctrine of 
claim preclusion "requires assertion of all theories for relief against a defendant with 
respect to all or part of a transaction, or series of transactions out of which the action 
arose." Lane v. Honeywell Inc.. 663 F.Supp. 370, 373 (D.Utah 1987). In other words, 
claims are identical when the same evidence supports both the present and former cause 
of action. State in Interest of J.J.T.. 877 P.2d 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing Round 
Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. B-Neva. Inc.. 606 P.2d 176 (Nev. 1980)). Moreover, if 
the only reason the claim was not decided in the prior action was because the party failed 
to raise it, the claim is barred by claim preclusion. Ringwood. 786 P.2d at 1356 (claims 
that were not brought in prior litigation regarding two settlement agreements barred by 
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claim preclusion because "the reason the claim was not litigated was solely because of 
[the party's] failure to assert the claim."). 
Applying the above principles to this case, it is apparent that Schotzen's claims for 
fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith and willful misconduct are 
barred by claim preclusion because these claims were based on facts which Scholzen 
knew prior to or immediately after the commencement of the Dockstader Litigation. 
Thus, these claims could have and should have been brought in the Dockstader Litigation. 
Although the Complaint alleged new legal theories against the Palmers, the factual 
support for these new legal theories is virtually the same as the factual support for 
Scholzen's Crossclaim in the Dockstader Litigation. Even a cursory comparison of facts 
alleged in Scholzen's Crossclaim with the facts alleged in the Complaint underscores this 
point. For example, Scholzen's Crossclaim in the Dockstader Litigation made the 
following factual allegations: 
6. That at the time [Scholzen's interest in the Property] 
was sold to [the Palmers], and prior thereto, [Scholzen] 
specifically informed [the Palmers of their] duty and 
responsibility to provide a 20-foot easement pursuant to the 
Settlement Agreement. 
7. That at the time of the sale of [Scholzen's interest in 
the Property, the Palmers] for themselves and by and through 
counsel, affirmed [their] responsibility to provide an 
appropriate easement as required in the described Settlement 
Agreement. 
* * * 
12. That [the Palmers] accepted the Property with the 
responsibility of obtaining the easement directly from 
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Dockstader, and that, as such, [the Palmers] should indemnify 
[Scholzen] for any costs or expenses incurred in defending 
[the Dockstader Litigation], including attorneys' fees, etc. 
(R.64-65). 
Although the wording has been changed and a few "new facts" added, the 
Complaint is nothing more than an expanded, puffed-up version of the Crossclaim.6 As 
such, the Complaint is barred by claim preclusion. As this Court explained in American 
Estate Mgmt. Corp., plaintiffs are "not entitled to pursue their claims . . . through 
piecemeal litigation, offering one legal theory to the court while holding others in reserve 
for future litigation should the first prove unsuccessful." 986 P.2d at 769. 
Scholzen's argument "that there were never enough facts presented to warn 
Scholzen of the fraud, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith or willful misconduct" of the 
Palmers until late 1998 is simply not credible, much less persuasive. As a practical 
matter, Scholzen knew that the Palmers had not provided Dockstader with an easement 
prior to the commencement of the Dockstader Litigation. Indeed, the Palmers' refusal to 
provide Dockstader with an easement was the impetus for the Dockstader Litigation. At 
the very latest, Scholzen knew that the Palmers did not intend to be bound by the 
Settlement Agreement when the Palmers filed their Answer to Scholzen's Crossclaim in 
6
 An example of Scholzen's so-called "new facts" is a telephone conversation between 
counsel for the Palmers and Mr. Dunn, counsel for Scholzen, in which counsel for the 
Palmers allegedly told Mr. Dunn that the Palmers would be bound by the Settlement 
Agreement. This telephone call, however, occurred several months before the 
commencement of the Dockstader Litigation. (R. 4-5). 
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July 1997. In their Answer, the Palmers specifically denied that they agreed to provide an 
easement to Dockstader or that they purchased Scholzen's interest in the real property 
subject to the Settlement Agreement. (Rl. 45-46). The Palmers' position was further 
explicitly stated in their Twelfth Affirmative Defense that the Settlement Agreement was 
not binding on them. (R. 47-48). The Palmers' good faith attempts to resolve the 
Dockstader Litigation by negotiating with Dockstader does not change the fact that the 
Palmers have consistently asserted from the outset of the Dockstader Litigation that they 
are not obligated to provide Dockstader with an easement pursuant to either the 
Settlement Agreement, to which they are not parties, or the Purchase Agreement, which is 
an integrated document. 
Judge Beacham's decision in the Dockstader Litigation further eviscerates 
Scholzen's argument. In denying Scholzen's Motion to Amend (R. 104), Judge Beacham 
found that Scholzen's arguments of ignorance and surprise meritless: 
Scholzen's proposed amendments are brought late in this 
litigation, after considerable discovery, time and expense, but 
are based on alleged facts of which Scholzen seems to have 
had, or should have had, knowledge of from very near the 
outset of this case without providing the Court with an 
adequate explanation for the delay Furthermore, 
Scholzen's proposed amended crossclaims are all in the 
nature of tort claims, while the subject of this action and all 
discovery conducted by the parties has involved, to this point, 
only contract claims. As a general rule, tort actions and 
claims for punitive damages are not actionable within a 
contract claim, unless the alleged acts also support a cause of 
action in tort, [internal citations omitted] In addition, 
Scholzen has demonstrated virtually no factual basis for the 
proposed claims, and the courts generally refuse to allow 
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leave to amend the pleadings when the proposed changes 
appear futile. 
(R. 104-05).7 
Scholzen's statement that "[generally people do not know when they are being 
defrauded" is similarly flawed. (App. Brief at 30). Scholzen certainly knew all of the 
facts that it now claims supports its cause of action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, 
bad faith and willful misconduct. Because Scholzen knew or should have known all of 
the facts alleged in support of the Complaint prior to or soon after the commencement of 
the Dockstader Litigation, Scholzen's claims for fraud in the inducement, negligent 
misrepresentation, bad faith and willful misconduct should have been brought in the 
Dockstader Litigation. 
The district court's decision to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds of claim 
preclusion is consistent with the recent case of Macris & Associates, supra. Here, the 
factual bases for Scholzen's claims against the Palmers for fraud in the inducement, 
negligent misrepresentation, bad faith, and willful misconduct arose before Scholzen filed 
the Crossclaim because Scholzen knew or should have know of all of the facts giving rise 
to these claims prior to Scholzen's filing of the Crossclaim. Macris & Associates. 986 
P.2d at 750-751. 
7
 In its brief, Scholzen takes issue with Judge Beacham's decision to deny its Motion to 
Amend. (App. Brief at 31-32). This is not the proper forum, however, for Scholzen to 
appeal Judge Beacham's denial of its Motion to Amend. 
308789.2 27 
Judge Beacham's denial of Scholzen's Motion to Amend does not change this 
result. Scholzen's statement that it "was not allowed to bring those claims" in the 
Dockstader Litigation (App. Brief at 29) is misleading. Scholzen waited for well over a 
year after the Palmers filed their Answer denying any obligation to provide the easement 
to file the Motion to Amend. Contrary to Scholzen's assertions, Judge Beacham did not 
deny the Motion to Amend for the primary reason that the Dockstader Litigation involved 
contract claims and the proposed claims were tort claims. Rather, Judge Beacham 
determined that the Motion to Amend was too late in the game because Scholzen knew or 
should have known of the facts giving rise to these claims from the outset of the case. 
The fact that these claims were tort claims merely highlighted the prejudice to the 
Palmers at this late stage of the Dockstader Litigation. More importantly, however, Judge 
Beacham denied Scholzen's Motion because there was simply no evidence to support 
these claims and the Motion to Amend would have been futile. 
And, as Judge Beacham appropriately recognized, Scholzen knew or should have 
known of all of the facts giving rise to these tort claims at or near the commencement of 
the Dockstader Litigation. Thus, Scholzen's failure to assert these claims in a timely 
manner does not preclude the application of claim preclusion. Indeed, this Court's 
decision in Ringwood is equally applicable in this case: 
The court in the prior action determined that the October note 
was nullified by merger into the November agreement so that 
Ringwood could not assert a claim under the October note. 
Since Ringwood failed to assert a claim under the November 
agreement either initially or by amendment to his complaint, 
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the case was properly dismissed. Obviously, a claim by 
Ringwood under the prior agreement could have been decided 
in the prior action, as the agreement was extant and was in 
default. The only reason it was not decided was because 
Ringwood failed to raise the claim However, the reason 
the claim was not litigated was solely because of Ringwood's 
failure to assert the claim. 
786P.2datl357. 
Finally, Scholzen cannot save its claims by arguing that they are "tort claims" not 
"contract claims" and therefore the doctrine of claims preclusion does not apply. (App. 
Brief at. 28-32). Utah courts have repeatedly held that claim preclusion applies to all 
claims that "could have or should have been brought" in previous litigation between the 
parties. American Estate Mgmt. Corp.. 986 P.2d at 768. Thus, Scholzen's tort claims are 
barred, not because they are identical to the claims asserted in the Dockstader Litigation, 
but because they could have and should have been brought in the Dockstader Litigation. 
The Oregon Supreme Court confronted these same arguments in Whitaker v. Bank 
of Newport. 836 P.2d 695 (Or. 1992). In Whitaker. the plaintiffs alleged that their tort 
claims were not barred by a previous contract action against the same party. In ruling that 
the tort claims were barred by claim preclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court stated: 
When a party has suffered various kinds of harm to the same 
kind of interest at the hands of the same defendant, it is 
reasonable to expect that all theories of recovery, whether in 
contract or tort, will be explored in a single proceeding. 
* * * 
When a party commits a series of acts, each of which is at 
least theoretically actionable as an individual case, but the 
victim of those acts is a single party and the acts all were 
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motivated by a common end, scheme or plan, it is reasonable 
to treat all the acts as a single occasion for judicial relief. 
* * * 
[W]here two very different acts combine to cause a single 
form of harm, the argument for preclusion is strengthened. 
Moreover, the fact that succeeding cases involve tort and 
contract is no reason to bar preclusion, where the complaining 
party could have been made whole in one proceeding for both 
kinds of harm done by the other party. 
Id. at 700 (internal citations omitted). 
For these reasons, the second requirement of claim preclusion is met in this case 
because Scholzen could have and should have brought these claims in the Dockstader 
Litigation. 
B. The Final Judgment Requirement is Met in this Case. 
Finally, Scholzen argues that the third requirement of claim preclusion, final 
judgment, is not met in this case because Scholzen1 s claims "were never presented in any 
way to the court, therefore, none of Scholzen's tort claims against [the Palmers] were 
fully litigated to a judgment on the merits." (App. Brief at 32). Scholzen's statement is 
not only untrue, it reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the final judgment 
requirement. Indeed, this Court recently rejected a similar argument in American Estate 
Mgmt Corp.. 986 P.2d 765. 
In American Estate Memt. Corp.. AEM filed a Complaint against IID for breach of 
a separation agreement resulting from IID's failure to deed certain property to AEM. The 
district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of IID on the breach of 
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contract claim. AEM subsequently brought an action against IID claiming ownership to 
the property by adverse possession. The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of IID on the basis of claim preclusion. Id. at 766. In affirming the district court's 
decision, this Court held that the claim preclusion barred the adverse possession claim 
because it could have and should have been brought in the first action. Id. at 767-68. 
With respect to the final judgment requirement, this Court held that the district court's 
grant of summary judgment on the breach of contract claim in the first action "constituted 
a judgment on the merits" for purposes of claim preclusion in the second action. Id. at 
769. 
Similarly, the final judgment requirement is satisfied in this case because Judge 
Beacham, after considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to Scholzen, 
granted summary judgment to the Palmers on Scholzen's claim that the Palmers agreed to 
be bound by the Settlement Agreement and provide an additional easement to 
Dockstader. (R. 99-107). Moreover, these specific claims were decided in the 
Dockstader Litigation. Judge Beacham evaluated these claims pursuant to Scholzen's 
Motion to Amend and ruled that "Scholzen has demonstrated virtually no factual basis for 
the proposed claims." (R. 105). The doctrine of claim preclusion bars Scholzen from 
doing so now. 
As demonstrated above, all of the elements of claim preclusion are satisfied in this 
case and the district court correctly dismissed the Complaint because Scholzen's claims 
are barred by claim preclusion. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE 
COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS OF ISSUE PRECLUSION. 
The second branch of res judicata, collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, also bars 
Scholzen's Complaint. Issue preclusion "prevents the relitigation of issues that have once 
been adjudicated even though the claims for relief in the separate actions may be 
different;' Harline v. Barken 912 P.2d 433, 442 (Utah 1996). The "minimum reach of 
issue preclusion beyond precise repetition of the first action is to prevent relitigation by 
mere introduction of cumulative evidence bearing on a simple historical fact that has once 
been decided." Id. at 443. The "broad" reach of issue preclusion includes "efforts to 
advance new arguments as to facts that had been fixed by the time of the first litigation." 
Id 
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, Scholzen is barred 
from relitigating all of the material facts alleged in support of the Complaint. These facts 
were decided adversely to Scholzen in the Dockstader Litigation. (R. 98-107). 
Consequently, Scholzen's claims against the Palmers should be dismissed because there 
is no factual support for these claims. 
In its brief, Scholzen correctly cites the elements of claim preclusion: (1) the issue 
challenged must be identical in the previous action and in the case at hand; (2) the issue 
must have been decided in a final judgment on the merits in the previous action; (3) the 
issue must have been competently, fully and fairly litigated in the previous action; and (4) 
the party against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in the current action must have been 
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either a party or privy to a party in the previous action. (App. Brief at 32-33); Gardner v. 
Madsen, 949 P.2d 785 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). As discussed further below, the district 
court correctly dismissed the Complaint under the doctrine of issue preclusion because all 
four requirements are satisfied in this case. 
A. The Issues in Both Cases Were Identical. 
The first element of issue preclusion is met because the issues in the Dockstader 
Litigation and this litigation are identical with respect to Scholzen's claims against the 
Palmers. Scholzen, however, argues that the first requirement is not met because "the 
issues raised by the complaint in this case are completely different" (App. Brief at 33). 
Scholzen is wrong. In this case, Scholzen is attempting to advance new arguments 
supported by facts that have already been decided in the Dockstader Litigation. (R. 99-
107). Specifically, the issue presented in the Dockstader Litigation was whether the 
Palmers agreed to grant Dockstader an easement. To support its position in the 
Dockstader Litigation, Scholzen argued not only that the Palmers agreed to be bound by 
the Settlement Agreement but that Scholzen was misled by the Palmers and that it relied 
on the Palmers' misrepresentations in closing the sale of its interest in the real property to 
the Palmers. (R. 103). Scholzen's evidence of these alleged representations consisted of 
a fax cover sheet and a letter from Shawn Ferrin to Scholzen requesting information on 
the Settlement Agreement. (R. 103). 
In this case, Scholzen is once again arguing that the Palmers misled Scholzen and 
that Scholzen relied on the Palmers' misrepresentations. (R. 1-12). Scholzen's efforts to 
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differentiate the issues in this case as issues involving "intent" are unavailing. The facts 
may be framed somewhat differently from the Dockstader Litigation, but the issue is 
essentially the same: did the Palmers agree to provide an easement or represent to 
Scholzen that they would provide an easement to Dockstader? The question has been 
answered adversely to Scholzen by Judge Beacham in the Dockstader Litigation. 
B. There Was a Final Judgment in the Dockstader Litigation, 
The second element of issue preclusion is met in this case because Judge Beacham 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Palmers. Scholzen's argument that the second 
element is lacking because Judge Beacham denied Scholzen's Motion to Amend simply 
misses the point. After considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Scholzen, Judge Beacham found that the Palmers "never agreed to be bound by the 
Settlement Agreement or to grant Dockstader [an easement]." (R. 99-107). Moreover, 
Judge Beacham considered and rejected Scholzen's claim that it was "mislead" by the 
"representations" of the Palmers because Scholzen provided "absolutely no evidence" to 
support these allegations. (R. 103). Judge Beacham's decision was therefore a final 
judgment on the merits. See American Estate Mgmt. Corp., 986 P.2d at 769; Sevy v. 
Security Title Co.. 902 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1995) (requirement of final judgment on the 
merits is met when court examines the substantive arguments of the parties and bases its 
decision on related case law). 
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C. The Issues Were Competently, Fully and Fairly Litigated, 
The issue of whether the Palmers agreed to provide Dockstader an easement or 
misled Scholzen regarding its agreement to provide the easement were competently, fully 
and fairly litigated in the Dockstader Litigation. As explained above, the Palmers and 
Scholzen filed numerous memoranda and affidavits on these issues, including the 
memoranda supporting and opposing Dockstader's two Motions for Partial Summary 
Judgment, Scholzen's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Palmers' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Scholzen's Motion to Amend. Scholzen's purported 
"concession" on the Palmers' Motion for Summary Judgment notwithstanding, Scholzen 
fully briefed and argued these issues at oral argument. Thus, the third element is satisfied 
in this case. 
D. Scholzen was a Party to the Dockstader Litigation and This Litigation, 
There is no dispute that the fourth element of issue preclusion is met in this case 
because Scholzen was a party to the Dockstader Litigation. 
Accordingly, because all of the elements of issue preclusion are satisfied in this 
case, Scholzen was barred from relitigating the following issues: (1) whether the Palmers 
agreed to be bound by the Settlement Agreement; (2) whether the Palmers otherwise 
agreed to provide Dockstader with an easement; (3) whether the Palmers, through their 
attorney, represented that they would be bound by the Settlement Agreement or provide 
an easement; and (4) whether Scholzen reasonably relied on these alleged representations 
in entering into the Purchase Agreement with the Palmers. 
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Without these factual underpinnings, Scholzen's claims for fraud in the 
inducement, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith and willful misconduct necessarily fail 
and the district court correctly dismissed the Complaint. See In re General 
Determination, 982 P.2d at 70-71 (when findings in previous litigation are determinative 
of the same issue in the present case, issue preclusion applies to bar relitigation of the 
issue). Thus, the district court correctly dismissed the Complaint under the doctrine of 
issue preclusion. 
III. DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO RULE 12(B)(6) OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WAS APPROPRIATE. 
Scholzen objects to the dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (App. Brief at 13-25). Scholzen's objection is too late. 
In their memorandum in support of their Motion to Dismiss, the Palmers argued that the 
Complaint should be dismissed for the additional reason that Scholzen failed to plead any 
facts sufficient to support its claims of fraud in the inducement, negligent 
misrepresentation, bad faith and willful misconduct. (R. 35-36). In opposing the Motion 
to Dismiss, Scholzen, however, did not dispute this alternative basis for dismissing the 
Complaint. (R. 110-17). Rather, Scholzen only opposed the Palmers' res judicata, 
collateral estoppel and damages arguments. (R. 113-17). Consequently, Scholzen may 
not now challenge the dismissal of the Complaint on the basis of Rule 12 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125, 129-130 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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Nevertheless, the Palmers will briefly address the correctness of dismissing the 
Complaint for failure to state a claim against the Palmers on which relief could be 
granted. 
A. Fraud in the Inducement-Rescission and Damages. 
Scholzen's first and second causes of action for fraud in the inducement were 
correctly dismissed because Scholzen, in order to prevail, must prove each of the 
following elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a representation was made; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the 
representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, know that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) 
to his injury and damage. Otsuka Elecs. v. Imaging Specialists. Inc.. 937 P.2d 1274,1278 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997); Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Mvers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
Even assuming all of the allegations in the Complaint are true, Scholzen cannot 
establish that its reliance on the alleged representations of the Palmers was reasonable, 
particularly in light of the fact that the Purchase Agreement, which contains an integration 
clause, did not mention the Settlement Agreement or the easement. (R. 101-02). 
A recent decision of this Court is particularly instructive on this point. In Maynard 
v. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the buyers and sellers entered into an 
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earnest money agreement for the purchase of real property. After entering into the 
agreement, they learned that the sellers did not own a portion of the real property referred 
to as Lot 15. Prior to the closing of the sale, the buyers delivered closing instructions to 
the sellers and the title company reserving their right to sue the sellers for damages and 
fees because the sellers did not own Lot 15 as represented on the earnest money 
agreement. The buyers and sellers then proceeded with the closing and signed a warranty 
deed which excluded Lot 15. This Court refused to apply the fraud exception to the 
merger doctrine because the buyers could not establish that they acted reasonably. This 
Court acknowledged that the merger doctrine is "an admittedly harsh rule of law" and, 
quoting the Utah Supreme Court, stated: 
Nevertheless, Utah adheres to the merger doctrine because 'it 
preserves the integrity of the final document of conveyance 
and encourages the diligence of the parties.' Parties to real 
estate transactions have a duty to 'make certain that their 
agreements have in fact been fully included in the final 
documents.' [Pjarties to the sale of real estate must confirm 
that all agreements relating to conveyance of title are 
incorporated into the deed before they tender or accept it. 
Id. at 449 (emphasis in the original). See also Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, 
Inc.. 875 P.2d 570, 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (reliance on alleged representations 
regarding condition of house was not reasonable because the purchase agreement stated 
that the house was sold "as is" and the agreement superseded any prior written or oral 
agreement); Despain v. Despain. 855 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (no reasonable 
reliance where plaintiff was represented by counsel in signing the quit claim deed and the 
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status of the property was readily available for examination and inspection); Flemming v. 
Flemming-Felt Co.. 323 P.2d 712, 715-716 (Utah 1958) (no fraud when the rights and 
obligations of the charging party are clearly spelled out in the written documents, the 
contents of which the charging party was entirely aware. The fact that the contract may 
have placed him in a position of disadvantage or even hardship will not support a charge 
of fraud in the inducement). 
Scholzen attempts to circumvent the obvious impact of these decisions by arguing 
that its reliance was reasonable because the Palmers "statements and actions" led 
Scholzen to believe that the Palmers would be subject to the Settlement Agreement (App. 
Brief at 17).8 This argument defies reason. This was an arms-length, commercial real 
estate transaction that was fully documented pursuant to the Purchase Agreement and the 
Warranty Deed. Both parties were represented by counsel. Scholzen has been unable to 
produce one piece of paper that supports its assertion that the Palmers agreed to provide 
Dockstader an easement. 
8
 In its brief, Scholzen frequently cites to its own Complaint as support for its assertions. 
For example, Scholzen states that a "representation was made" because Shawn Ferrin 
indicated that the Palmers were aware of the requirement to provide the easement and that 
the Palmers would be subject to the Settlement Agreement. (App. Brief at 16-17, 20). 
Scholzen then cites to its own Complaint. Judge Beacham clearly saw through such 
unsubstantiated, self-serving statements when he ruled that there was "no evidentiary 
foundation" for Scholzen's statement that "[the Palmers] acknowledged that the property 
was subject to the Settlement Agreement" and that the letter from Shawn Ferrin submitted 
by Scholzen to support this statement "does not support the assertion made." Judge 
Beacham further found that other similar statements made by Scholzen in the Dockstader 
Litigation were hearsay, inadmissible and not otherwise properly supported. (R. 100). 
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Not only do the Purchase Agreement, which is an integrated document, and the 
Warranty Deed fail to mention the easement, there is not even a letter from Mr. Dunn to 
the Palmers confirming these so-called agreements and understandings. Under these 
circumstances, Scholzen's purported reliance was not reasonable as a matter of law. 
Dismissal of Scholzen's claim for fraud is also correct because Palmers' alleged 
promise to provide an easement would be a "misrepresentation of intended future 
performance." As such, it is not a "presently existing fact" upon which a claim for fraud 
can be based. See Andalex Resources, Inc.. 871 P.2d at 1047 (misrepresentation of 
intended future performance is not "presently existing fact" upon which a claim for fraud 
can be based unless plaintiff can prove that defendant, at the time of representation, did 
not intend to perform promise and made representation for purpose of deceiving the 
plaintiff). And, as acknowledged by Scholzen, the Palmers entered into negotiations with 
Dockstader for the easement after execution of the Purchase Agreement. (R. 1-12). 
B. Negligent Misrepresentation, 
Scholzen also failed to plead any facts sufficient to establish a claim for negligent 
misrepresentation. (R. 9). To prove negligent misrepresentation, Scholzen must establish 
by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Palmers owed Scholzen some duty of care; 
(2) that Scholzen was injured by its "reasonable reliance" on the Palmers' "careless or 
negligent misrepresentation of a material fact"; (3) that the Palmers "had a pecuniary 
interest in the transaction, were in a superior position to know the material facts; and (4) 
that the Palmers should have reasonably foreseen" that Scholzen was likely to rely upon 
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the fact. See Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & GunnelL 713 P.2d 55, 59-60 (Utah 
1986); Dugan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980). Scholzen must also prove that the 
Palmers owed Scholzen some duty of care. See Ellis v. Hale. 373 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah 
1962) (To establish liability for negligent misrepresentation, there must be a "special duty 
of care running from the representor to the representee" which does not exist when parties 
are dealing at arm's length). 
As stated above, the Palmers and Scholzen were on the opposite sides of an arms-
length transaction. Both parties were represented by counsel. The Palmers were not in a 
fiduciary or other similar special relationship with Scholzen. Even assuming the Palmers 
had such a duty, Scholzen's purported reliance on these alleged representations was not 
justifiable or reasonable. As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Jardine v. Brunswick 
Corp.. 423 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1967): 
The one who complains of being injured by such a false 
representation cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is 
told him, but has the duty of exercising such degree of care to 
protect his own interests as would be exercised by an 
ordinary, reasonable and prudent person under the 
circumstances; and if he fails to do so, is precluded from 
holding someone else to account for the consequences of his 
own neglect. 
Consequently, dismissal of Scholzen's claim for negligence misrepresentation is 
appropriate for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
C. Bad Faith, 
Similarly, Scholzen's claim for bad faith was correctly dismissed because 
Scholzen pled no set of facts that would support a cause of action for bad faith. (R. 9-10). 
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Although the covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most contractual 
relationships, it does not create a new and independent duty on the Palmers' to provide an 
easement that is not found in the Purchase Agreement. See Andalex Resources, Inc.. 871 
P.2d at 1048 (The covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be consitrued to establish 
new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties). Accordingly, 
Scholzen's fifth cause of action for bad faith was correctly dismissed for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted. 
D, Willful Misconduct 
Finally, the Complaint fails to plead any facts that would support Scholzen's claim 
of willful misconduct. (R. 11). Consequently, Scholzen's sixth cause of action was 
correctly dismissed for the same reasons as stated above. 
IV. DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE 
SCHOLZEN SUFFERED NO DAMAGES. 
Scholzen's Complaint against the Palmers was also correctly dismissed because 
Scholzen did not suffer any damages as a result of the Palmers' alleged conduct and 
therefore the Complaint was premature. The Dockstader Litigation is ongoing and there 
has been no determination that Scholzen is liable to Dockstader for damages. Indeed, a 
trial date has been set for May 1-3,2000. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons stated above, the Court should affirm the district court's 
dismissal of the Complaint. 
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DATED this /£_ day of January, 2000. 
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